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Descartes’s Critique of the Syllogistic 
 
Abstract 
This article presents a novel reading of Descartes’s critique of the 
traditional syllogistic. The reading differs from those previously 
presented by scholars who regard Descartes’s critique as a version of a 
well-known argument: that syllogisms are circular or non-ampliative 
and thus trivial. It is argued that Descartes did not see syllogisms as 
defective in themselves. For him the problem was rather that anyone 
considering a valid and informative syllogism must already know, by 
an intuition wholly independent of the syllogism, that the conclusion 
follows from the premises. Moreover, without such an intuition the 
syllogistic on its own is incapable of determining whether the 
consequence truly holds. Thus the syllogistic is useless unless 
accompanied by an intuition that renders it otiose. This reading of 
Descartes’s view is supported and explained by examples drawn from 
Descartes’s writing and from the Port-Royal Logic—one of the first 
attempts to develop a logical system on Cartesian principles. 
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1. Introduction 
Descartes’s main criticism of the syllogistic, in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, is 
as follows: 
…to make it even clearer that the [syllogistic] art of reasoning 
contributes nothing whatever to knowledge of the truth, we should 
realize that, on the basis of their method, dialecticians are unable to 
formulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless they are already in 
possession of the substance of the conclusion, i.e. unless they have 
previous knowledge of the very truth deduced in the syllogism. It is 
obvious therefore that they themselves can learn nothing new from 
such forms of reasoning, and hence that ordinary dialectic is of no use 
whatever to those who wish to investigate the truth of things (Rule 10, 
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AT 10.406 / CSM 1.36-7 – “AT” and “CSM” refer to edition and 
translation of Descartes’s works – see reference list). 
The accusation against the dialecticians is not obviously justified. It is easy, following 
the rules of syllogistic, to form a syllogism that has as its conclusion any given 
proposition consisting of subject-, predicate-, quantity-, and quality-terms. And if the 
proposition happens to be true then one has thereby constructed a syllogism with a true 
conclusion, without having known that the conclusion was true.  
Of course, the syllogism thus formed need not be valid. Perhaps Descartes means 
that it is impossible to construct a valid syllogism without knowing ahead of time that 
its conclusion is true. This also seems wrong; one might choose a random middle term 
and thereby form a valid syllogism with the required conclusion by blind chance. 
Suppose we further qualify Descartes’s claim: it is impossible for dialecticians to 
construct a syllogism they know to be valid, with premises they know to be true, without 
knowing ahead of time that the conclusion is true. This claim is sufficiently plausible 
that various philosophers have suggested it; by the late nineteenth century John Stuart 
Mill could state unequivocally that “Logicians have been remarkably unanimous” in 
claiming something to this effect (Mill 2004, 2.3.1). I suspect that it is what Descartes 
means in the passage quoted. But I will argue that he does not believe it for the same 
reason as Mill nor the logicians to whom Mill implicitly refers. 
I propose that Descartes’s implicit reasoning runs as follows: Some intuitively 
invalid arguments can be expressed in a form such that the syllogistic will rule them 
valid. And often the very same arguments can be rendered invalid under syllogism by 
being expressed in a slightly different form. The syllogistic on its own thus gives 
inconsistent results. Knowing whether an argument is expressed in the appropriate 
form for the syllogistic to be usefully applied to it requires one to have some intuitive 
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knowledge beyond the syllogistic. But this intuitive knowledge is enough to show the 
conclusion to be true without the need of the syllogistic. 
This reading explains Descartes’s complaint that truth often “slips through the 
fetters” of syllogisms, “while those who employ them are left entrapped in them”.1 Truth 
slips through the fetters of the syllogistic when an intuitively valid argument is 
expressed in such a way that the syllogistic is incapable of showing its validity: it is an 
instance of no valid syllogistic form. Those remain trapped in the syllogistic who cannot 
see by intuition that the argument is nevertheless valid. I shall explain both points using 
examples both from Descartes and from the Port-Royal Logic – a work that is, as Jill 
Vance Buroker has argued, “situated in the general framework of Cartesian philosophy” 
(Buroker 1993). 2 The examples will also serve to elucidate what I mean by “intuitive 
validity”. 
In reading Descartes in this way, I am disagreeing with other interpreters, who 
read Descartes’s claim as being that the syllogistic is inherently incapable of delivering 
informative demonstrations – that its intrinsic formal qualities render it non-ampliative 
in every application. Descartes can admit that many syllogisms would be, in virtue of 
their formal qualities, perfectly capable of demonstrating previously unknown truths 
were it not for something outside of them – the intuition that accompanies them, 
reveals their conclusion, and thus renders them otiose. Nor could we attend to the 
syllogisms while ignoring this intuition, since we need it in order to be sure we have set 
up our arguments in the right way to apply the formal syllogistic tests. Syllogisms 
without intuition are blind. But if intuition is there, we have no need of the syllogistic. 
Descartes permits that we can acquire knowledge by using syllogisms but implies that 
we do so by using a sort of intuition that is quite independent of the formal rules of the 
syllogistic – neither adequately captured nor restricted by them. 
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2. Other readings of Descartes’s critique 
As an example of a reading that contrasts with mine, John Passmore associates 
Descartes’s critique with that of Mill in the System of Logic (Passmore 1953, 548). Mill 
argues that the syllogism is a petitio principii: the very form of the syllogism ensures 
that the premises cannot be asserted unless the conclusion is already assumed. Thus in 
the syllogism “Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal” the 
conclusion is assumed in the assertion of the major premise:  
we cannot be assured of the mortality of all men, unless we are already 
certain of the mortality of every individual man: that if it be still 
doubtful whether Socrates, or any other individual we choose to name, 
be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty must hang over the 
assertion, All men are mortal (Mill 2004, 2.3.2). 
In claiming to know that all men are mortal, in other words, one claims to know that 
Socrates is mortal. The syllogistic demonstration adds no knowledge in the conclusion 
to what is contained in the premises.3  
But why should it be impossible to know that all men are mortal without 
knowing that Socrates is mortal? For Mill, knowledge of a general proposition such as 
“all men are mortal” is always arrived at by induction from particular propositions such 
as “John is mortal”; “Thomas is mortal”; etc. (Mill 2004, 2.3.3). In a sense we can move 
from knowledge of a general proposition to knowledge of another particular one, 
besides the particulars from which the general was inductively inferred. But this is 
really no different from inferring the latter particular from the former ones; the general 
proposition is redundant (Mill 2004, 2.3.3). 
Descartes, however, has no reason to accept this analysis. As Calvin Normore 
notes, “Descartes does not establish the truth of universal premises by induction from 
singulars” (Normore 1993, 439). He does insist that particular propositions are prior to 
general ones in the order of discovery (AT 7.206 / CSM 2.271). But he does not claim 
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that general propositions are inductively inferred from particular ones. He is in fact not 
very clear on the process by which we move from particular to general notions. But 
some hints are given in his discussion of his cogito argument.4 In the Principles we find 
the following: 
…when I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is the 
first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an 
orderly way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first know 
what thought existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that 
that which thinks should not exist… (AT 8A.8 / CSM 1.196). 
There is an apparent contradiction in his saying that “I am thinking therefore I exist” is 
the first thing to occur to us and also that we must first know other things, including the 
general proposition “it is impossible that what thinks should not exist”. As Margaret 
Wilson suggests, it is possible that Descartes simply could not make up his mind about 
this (Wilson 1982, 50).5 
A less controversial example is found in Descartes’s construal of his ontological 
argument in the Fifth Replies: 
That which we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the true 
and immutable nature, or essence, or form of something, can be truly 
asserted of that thing. But once we have made a sufficiently careful 
investigation of what God is, we clearly and distinctly understand that 
existence belongs to his true and immutable nature. Here we can now 
truly assert of God that he does exist (AT 7.115-6 / CSM 2.83).6 
Here the order of Descartes’s reasoning seems to run quite clearly from a general 
proposition – what is clearly and distinctly perceived to belong to the essence of 
anything can be truly asserted of that thing – to a particular one – existence can be truly 
asserted of God.  
Although this textual evidence is not decisive, there is enough here to suggest 
that Descartes allows for the possibility of deducing new particular propositions from 
general ones. At best he suggests only that a general proposition cannot be explicitly 
known until some particular proposition instancing it is explicitly known – and even this 
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is ambiguous.7 Nothing Descartes says implies that every particular instance of a general 
proposition must be known before the general proposition itself is known. Consider his 
way of proceeding in the Third Meditation: from the particular case of the cogito he 
reasons to the general principle, that whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true, 
and then goes on to deduce what seem to be hitherto unknown – or at least hitherto 
uncertain – new particular propositions, for instance the existence of God, from it.8 
There is no good textual case for projecting onto Descartes the Millian view that to 
know a general proposition is already to know all of its particular instances. It is 
unlikely to be the basis of his critique of the syllogistic. 
For another contrast with my proposed reading, Stephen Gaukroger has 
proposed two interpretations of Descartes’s critique of the syllogism.  
The first reads Descartes as stating a traditional criticism, made for instance in 
Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Gaukroger 1989, 11–15). Sextus has an 
argument against proofs in general, which applies to the case of a categorical syllogism 
in the following way. Suppose we are unsure of the truth of the statement: “the fair is 
good”. In that case, the syllogistic reasoning, “The just is fair; the fair is good; therefore 
the just is good”, will be inconclusive, since one premise is uncertain. On the other hand, 
suppose we are certain of the truth of “the fair is good”. In that case, with that certainty 
in the background, we should be able to infer “the just is good” directly from “the just is 
fair” on its own. This means that the syllogistic is incomplete: SaM  SaP is not a valid 
syllogistic form. It also shows, at least on the principles of the philosophers whom 
Sextus is attacking, that the syllogistic is unsound. SaM; MaP  SaP, which is ruled valid 
in the syllogistic, is shown to have a redundant premise, and on the Stoic theory Sextus 
is attacking an inference with a redundant premise is invalid.9 
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Gaukroger points out some weaknesses of Sextus’s argument in the passage 
cited. But, independently of these, it is clear that the argument does not show what 
Descartes aims to show. There is some similarity between the two critiques, insofar as 
both Sextus and Descartes suggest that there are valid arguments that escape the 
syllogistic and invalid arguments ruled valid by it. But a major difference is that 
Descartes does believe there to be valid syllogisms. He becomes irritable when Bourdin 
accuses him of rejecting the syllogism, answering that he has “always been prepared to 
use syllogisms when the occasion required it” (AT 7.522 / CSM 2.355).10 We saw one 
example with his reconstruction of his ontological proof. If Descartes had regarded 
syllogisms as inherently either useless or invalid, as Sextus seems to do, he would not 
have used them.  
Sextus has another criticism of the syllogistic, however. He offers it despite 
having already dispensed with proofs in general, explaining that he is doing so because 
the Peripatetics and Stoics pride themselves so much upon their syllogisms. It is roughly 
the same as Mill’s critique and runs as follows: 
. . . whenever they argue “Every man is an animal, and Socrates is a 
man, therefore Socrates is an animal,’’ proposing to deduce from the 
universal proposition “Every man is an animal” the particular 
proposition “Socrates therefore is an animal”, which in fact goes . . . to 
establish by way of induction the universal proposition, they fall into 
the error of circular reasoning (Sextus Empiricus 1933, 2.196, p.276–
8.). 
As we have already seen, Descartes is unlikely to have accepted the premises behindthis 
critique. 
The second of Gaukroger’s interpretations of Descartes’s critique concerns what 
Aristotle refers to as demonstrative syllogisms (Gaukroger 1989, 16–18). A 
demonstrative syllogism is one with a particular and a universal premise, aiming at 
explanation. Its aim is to show, as Aristotle puts it why (διότι) the conclusion holds 
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rather than merely that (ὅτι) it holds. An example of a non-demonstrative syllogism is 
as follows: 
The planets do not twinkle,  
That which does not twinkle is near,  
Therefore the planets are near [i.e., nearer to the Earth than the stars].  
This syllogism is non-demonstrative since failure to twinkle does not explain nearness. 
That the planets do not twinkle does not explain why they are near. The following, by 
contrast, is demonstrative:  
The planets are near,  
That which is near does not twinkle, 
The planets do not twinkle. 
The nearness of the planets explains why they do not twinkle. Gaukroger implies that 
only demonstrative syllogisms are informative: “the latter produces understanding, the 
former does not” (Gaukroger 1989, 17). He then notes how Aristotle proposes that we 
can know the difference between demonstrative and non-demonstrative syllogisms “by 
a form of intellectual insight which he calls νοῦς”. Yet he asks: “what exactly is the 
difference that we are supposed to recognise?” So long as “it remains obscure what 
distinguishes the conclusions of demonstrative and non-demonstrative syllogisms …, 
we have no protection against Sextus’ charge of circularity” (Gaukroger 1989, 17). 
I cannot easily follow Gaukroger’s reasoning here. His point seems to be that if 
the distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative syllogisms cannot be 
explained, all syllogisms are at risk of being non-demonstrative and thus uninformative. 
But the fact that the difference cannot be explained does not entail that it cannot be 
recognised. Moreover, it is not clear why it would be a problem for the syllogistic if all 
syllogisms turned out to be non-demonstrative. Gaukroger’s implication is, if I read him 
 9 
rightly, that a syllogism will be circular if its conclusion explains one of its premises, as 
in the first of the two examples above. But there is no obvious circularity in an argument 
whose conclusion explains its premises. An argument is circular if one cannot know that 
the premises are true without first knowing that the conclusion is true; it does not 
matter if one cannot know why the premises are true without knowing the conclusion 
or anything else.11 One can easily know that something is true without knowing why; 
Descartes’s follower Christoph Wittich gave the Mysteries of the Faith as examples of 
knowledge ὅτι that cannot possibly (for us) be accompanied by knowledge διότι.12 
Primitive axioms in a formal system might be another example.  
Perhaps Gaukroger believes that Descartes’s complaint is only that syllogisms 
are not capable of being demonstrative. This does seem to be along the lines of the 
complaint that, for example, Francis Bacon had about the syllogistic (Bacon 2000, § 13, § 
105).13 But it does not explain why Descartes expresses himself the way he does: the 
problem that syllogisms cannot explain why their conclusions are true seems entirely 
independent of the fact (if it is a fact) that they cannot be formed until their conclusions 
are already known.  
Since all the arguments examined above, with the exception of Sextus’s first, aim 
at showing the syllogism to be inherently circular, it is worth reminding ourselves that 
Descartes never makes this accusation against it. Descartes complains that the truth 
derived in a syllogism must be known in advance of the construction of the syllogism. 
He does not argue that the conclusion of a syllogism must be contained in its premise(s). 
In his harshest criticism of the syllogistic, he claims that it is nothing but a way of 
“explaining to others the things one already knows or even, as in the art of Lully, for 
speaking without judgement about matters of which one is ignorant” (Preface to the 
French Principles, AT 9B.13 / CSM 1.186). It is difficult to see how an inherently circular 
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argument could serve either purpose. If B is contained in A then the argument AB 
seems no more didactically useful than the argument BB. Likewise for “speaking 
without judgement about matters of which one is ignorant”, as in the art of Lully. If 
neither A nor B is known then it might yet be informative to say that AB. But if B is 
contained in A then AB is no more informative than BB. 
3. My reading 
Descartes is well aware that the knowledge that B follows from A is distinct from the 
knowledge that A and that B.14 He gives the example of knowing not only that 2+2=4 
and that 3+1=4 but additionally that these two together entail that 2+2=3+1 – not, that 
is, simply that 2+2=3+1, but rather that this “proposition follows necessarily from the 
other two”.15 He is therefore well placed, as perhaps Mill and Sextus are not, to 
recognise that even a syllogism proving a truth already known can yield some new 
knowledge. To one who knows that A and that B, the argument that AB can still newly 
reveal that B follows from A. Why, then, should the syllogistic only be useful for the two 
purposes Descartes lists? Can it not also be useful for a third purpose, namely that of 
logically connecting up propositions that one knows independently – of determining 
which of the things one knows follow from which others? 
I propose that Descartes believed the syllogistic to be useless for that third 
purpose because: (i) intuition (and what Descartes calls “deduction”, which is intuition 
plus memory) is already sufficient for that purpose and (ii) syllogistic without intuition 
is unreliable and inconclusive.16 
To appreciate both points, we need only examine the example just given. 
Descartes is clear that we can know by intuition that 2+2=3+1 follows from 2+2=4 and 
3+1=4. By knowing the latter two propositions one easily reaches the first, without 
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explicitly applying any formal decision method. But can we be sure that we have not 
applied the syllogistic implicitly? Taking “2+2”, “3+1”, and “4” as terms and assuming 
arithmetic statements to be of universal quantity, we can construct the following perfect 
Barbara syllogism: 
(A) 2+2 is 4; 4 is 3+1 2+2 is 3+1. 
In reaching the conclusion from the premises, did we perhaps implicitly run through 
such a syllogism in our minds, without full awareness we were doing so? One reason to 
doubt this is that the argument seems no less compelling in the following form: 
(B) 2+2 is 4; 3+1 is 4 2+2 is 3+1. 
But this has the form of a second-figure syllogism without a negative premise; the 
syllogistic would rule it invalid. Yet it is no less intuitively obvious that the conclusion 
follows from the premises with the terms in (B) than in (A). One might insist that in (B) 
we implicitly rearrange the terms to derive the valid syllogism, but how do we know 
this is permissible? It is not permissible in the argument: 
(C) 7 is prime; 2 is prime 7 is 2. 
 
Here a medieval logician could make a number of points concerning the 
supposition of terms like “2” and “prime” in these propositions, and how this affects the 
conversion of the propositions. Suppose a convention to be in place such that numbers 
are always read with implicit universal quantity. Thus in (B), “3+1=4” would be read 
with universal quantity for both “3+1” and “4” – “every 3+1 is every 4” – whereas “7 is 
prime” in (C) would be read with universal quantity for “7” but not for “prime”. Then, 
according to the rules Terence Parsons draws from a variety of fourteenth-century 
sources, we would have distributed supposition for both terms in “3+1=4”, contrasted 
with distributed supposition for the subject term and merely confused supposition for 
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the predicate term in “7 is prime” (Parsons 2014, 7.4). This would then explain why the 
former can be converted to an A-proposition – “every 4 is (every) 3+1” – whereas the 
latter can only be converted to an I-proposition – “some prime is (every) 7”. Therefore 
converting “3+1=4” gives a valid Barbara form to (B), whereas converting “7 is prime” 
gives (C) an invalid AIA form. 
But Descartes would be on solid ground replying that such rules, applied in this 
case, look like ex post rationalisations for what any mathematically competent person 
already knows by simply looking at the examples. It is prima facie plausible that we only 
know we can rearrange the terms to form a valid syllogism in the one case and not the 
other because we know by intuition that the argument is valid in one case and not the 
other. At any rate Descartes is on solid ground with this example since, as Nelson notes: 
“It had always been fairly obvious that practical mathematical reasoning rarely fit into 
the formal straightjacket of Aristotelian syllogistic logic” (Nelson 2015).17 
We still need to work out what Descartes means by “intuition”.18 Let us begin by 
examining what Descartes has to say in comparing his own favoured method – one 
involving intuition – with the syllogistic: 
This is the sole respect in which we imitate the dialecticians: when 
they expound the forms of the syllogisms, they presuppose that the 
terms or subject-matter of the syllogisms are known; similarly, we are 
making it a prerequisite here that the problem under investigation is 
perfectly understood. But we do not distinguish, as they do, a middle 
term and two extreme terms. We view the whole matter in the 
following way. First, in every problem there must be something 
unknown; otherwise there would be no point posing the problem. 
Secondly, this unknown something must be delineated in some way, 
otherwise there would be nothing to point us to one line of 
investigation as opposed to any other. Thirdly, the unknown something 
can be delineated only by way of something else which is already 
known (Rule 13, AT 10.430 / CSM 1.51-2). 
The sort of problem he describes appears to be one in which the value of some bound 
variable – an “unknown something” delineated by way of something known – is to be 
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determined. This explains the relevance of the distinction between middle and extreme 
terms in the syllogism, since one version of the sort of problem to which Descartes 
refers is that of finding the middle term in a syllogism.  
Suppose, for instance, we face the incomplete syllogism: All whales are x; all x are 
warm-blooded; therefore all whales are warm-blooded. One solution to the problem is 
that x is “mammals”. Such exercises were popular during the Middle Ages, and at least 
one tradition believed the finding of middle terms in demonstrative syllogisms to be the 
main business of science (Kretzmann et al. 1988). But Descartes recognises that this is a 
special case of a more general kind of problem. Breaking the fetters of the syllogistic, we 
can look for a general method for solving the general problem – that is, solving for an 
unknown value, delineated in terms of known values, without requiring that the 
unknown value be the middle of a syllogism and the known values be extremes. 
Descartes gives the example of riddles. The riddle of the Sphinx, as a Cartesian problem, 
can be expressed as follows: x is four-footed in the morning; x is two-footed at midday; x 
is three-footed in the evening; x = ?  
There is not much use in trying to construe this as a syllogism with a missing 
middle. Nevertheless, there is a clear similarity to the problem of finding middle terms, 
in that finding the right value for x will result in a valid argument: if x is a human then x 
is four-footed to begin with, etc. The problem of the riddle is to find one value of x such 
that there is a valid inference from the statement that x possesses that value to the 
conjunction of the statements ascribing properties to x. Calling the conjunction of the 
given statements F, the problem is to find some a such that x=a ⊨ Fx. There may, of 
course, be more than one solution. Descartes claims that his method also applies to 
imperfect problems as well as perfect problems. From his examples, I infer that an 
imperfect problem is one with multiple possible solutions. One of his examples is a 
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simple curve-fitting problem: we can know “the nature of sound” from knowing that the 
same sound (presumably the same pitch, measured on some scale) is produced by one 
string, by another twice as thick and tensioned with a weight twice as heavy, and by a 
third twice as long, not as thick, and tensioned with a weight four times as heavy.19 Here 
the problem seems to be that of finding a function 𝑓(𝑙, 𝑡, 𝑤), such that the arguments 
(1,1,1), (1,2,2), and (2,
1
2
, 4) all generate the same value.20 There are, of course, 
indefinitely many correct solutions to this problem. But for any correct solution, for 
instance 𝑓(𝑙, 𝑡, 𝑤) =
𝑡
𝑤
2𝑙
2
, there will be a valid inference from the solution to the givens 
of the problem; that is, 𝑓(𝑙, 𝑡, 𝑤) =
𝑡
𝑤
2𝑙
2
 entails 𝑓(1,1,1) = 𝑓(1,2,2) = 𝑓 (2,
1
2
, 4). 
Descartes promises to outline a method for reducing every imperfect problem to a 
perfect one, a promise left unfulfilled. We can suppose he had in mind a way of 
specifying problems to the point that each only has one solution; for instance further 
conditions might be imposed on the unknown 𝑓(𝑙, 𝑡, 𝑤) such that only one function will 
be capable of both meeting them and generating the given results. In that case there will 
be a valid inference not only from the solution to the givens but also from the givens to 
the solution. In this way we can see how problems and inferences are related in 
Descartes’s thought. 
That there are non-syllogistic problems for Descartes indicates that there are 
non-syllogistic inferences. We already know that we can solve Cartesian problems 
without a formal method. The problem of finding middle terms yields to no such 
method; what Aristotle offers in the Topics are tips and guidelines rather than 
methodical rules. Llull (Lully) promises an art for finding middle terms, but for all the 
mechanical interest of his whirling apparatuses the information they contain is no more 
than a list of middles for a fixed set of extremes (Bonner 2007, 219ff.). Burgersdijck’s 
 15 
logic textbook – an example of a general type from the period – gives a set of 
mnemonics for working out which sort of middle term is needed to prove a particular 
proposition; for instance, to prove a universal affirmative proposition we need the 
middle term to be the antecedent of the predicate and the consequent of the subject 
(Burgersdijck 1644, 2.10.3). But knowing these required formal properties does not tell 
us how to find the required middle terms. That remains a matter of intuition or anyway 
some sort of informal process. 
Why, then, cannot the same informal faculty be invoked in judging the validity of 
the inferences produced when the problem is solved? The inference “if something is a 
human then it is four-footed in the morning, two-legged at midday, and three-legged in 
the evening” is implicated in the solution to the riddle of the Sphinx. Whatever faculty 
we use to solve the riddle goes beyond the syllogistic and the techniques for finding 
middle terms. This faculty is what I believe Descartes refers to as “intuition”.  
Descartes recognises, as Dutilh Novaes puts it, that:  
[t]he syllogistic system is a clear case of undergeneration w.r.t. the 
intuitive notion of logical validity: all valid syllogistic patterns are 
indeed intuitively valid, but the group of valid arguments described by 
syllogistics is but a very small subset of all intuitively valid logical 
arguments (Dutilh Novaes 2005b, 115). 
This is far from being a new recognition on Descartes’s part. Dutilh Novaes notes that 
early theories of consequentiae explicitly recognised that the syllogistic system 
chronically undergenerates; logicians then turned to Aristotle’s Topics to expand the 
range of consequences accepted as logically valid (Dutilh Novaes 2005b, 115). The fact 
that we can recognise this undergeneration shows that we must have an intuitive sense 
of validity going beyond the formal constraints of the syllogistic. This can explain why 
Descartes claims that “truth often slips through the fetters” of the syllogistic – or, more 
properly, validity often slips through its fetters.  
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But it does not explain why Descartes claims that it is impossible to construct a 
syllogism with a true conclusion without already knowing the substance of that 
conclusion. Elsewhere Descartes identifies the substance of a proposition with its 
terms.21 To explain what he means by claiming that one cannot construct a valid 
syllogism without knowing its terms, and thus knowing the truth deduced in the 
syllogism, I find it helpful to turn to the Port-Royal Logic, a work that examines the 
syllogistic from a position informed by the thought of Descartes.22 
4. Examples from the Port-Royal Logic 
The key examples are in Part Three, Chapter Nine of the Port-Royal Logic, which begins 
with a passage that strongly echoes Descartes’s warnings about dialectic. Logic can be 
as harmful to some as it is useful to others, and those who are most harmed by it  
attach themselves more to the external shell of the rules than to good 
sense, which is their soul; thus they are brought easily to reject as 
deficient reasoning that is perfectly good. They have not enough light 
to adjust the rules, which can only serve to deceive because they are 
understood imperfectly (Arnauld and Nicole 1992, 3.9, 190). 
One example of this hypercorrection can be found in response to the following 
syllogism: 
Divine law commands that we honour kings; 
Louis XIV is a king; 
 Divine law commands that we honour Louis XIV. 
There are, says the Port-Royal Logic, “persons of little intelligence”, who assert that this 
syllogism is vicious, on the grounds that it is in the second figure yet has no negative 
premise. This analysis divides up the terms as follows: 
S = “Divine law commands that we honour” 
M = “king(s)” 
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P = “Louis XIV”. 
But the authors object to taking “kings” as the predicate of the major. They give two 
arguments. First, kings are not affirmed of the divine law in the proposition. Second, 
they have argued elsewhere that the predicate of a proposition is always restricted by 
its subject, but here “kings” is taken generally rather than being restricted (Arnauld and 
Nicole 1992, 2.17). 
 Neither argument is compelling in its own right. First, “kings” in the major is 
predicated not of “divine law” but of “divine law commands that we honour”. We can 
read this as saying that it is true of (some of) what divine law commands that we honour 
that they are kings. The Port-Royal Logic analyses affirmative propositions as 
statements about the coextension of classes; in this case coextension is ascribed to the 
classes, things that divine law commands that we honour and kings. This seems a 
perfectly legitimate analysis. As for the second point, according to the Port-Royal Logic’s 
principles of analysis, we should read the extension of “kings” as implicitly restricted by 
“divine law commands that we honour”, since, in an affirmative proposition, we must 
take the extension of the predicate to be restricted by that of the subject (Arnauld and 
Nicole 1992, 2.17 - Axiom 4). Thus “kings” refers not to kings in general but only to 
those kings that divine law commands that we honour. And then if we analyse the major 
premise according to the principles of the Port-Royal Logic, the syllogism turns out to 
be formally invalid, just as the persons of little intelligence propose. Since the extension 
of “kings” is restricted by “divine law commands that we honour”, and since nothing in 
the premises assures us that Louis XIV falls into that extension, the conclusion does not 
follow formally. This intuitively unwarranted verdict on validity results from the 
unprejudiced application of the Port-Royal principles of analysis, contrary to the 
authors’ claim that their principles help us to avoid the unwarranted verdict. 
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At any rate, the authors propose that the verdict is unwarranted, and to show 
this they go on to rewrite the syllogism in this form: 
Kings should be honoured; 
Louis XIV is a king; 
 Louis XIV should be honoured.23 
Now the syllogism is perfectly valid in standard Barbara: “kings”, being in the subject 
position, is now unrestricted (predications of singular terms are again taken as 
universal). The question is: how do we know that this is a better way to construe the 
syllogism? Nothing on the surface of the original argument indicates that rewriting 
should be needed. It is only because rewriting allows us to avoid the unwanted verdict 
of invalidity that we find it preferable. Thus, rather than using the formal rules of 
syllogistic to decide validity, we use our knowledge of validity to express the syllogism 
in the right natural form – the natural form that allows the syllogistic rules to generate 
the result we already know to be correct concerning validity. 
Appealing to the categories of an earlier logical theory, we might say that in the 
syllogism expressed in the original form there is true material consequence but not true 
formal consequence.24 The premises really do entail the conclusion, though not on 
account of their logical form, at least not their explicit form. The business of the logician 
in such a case is not to reject the material consequence because of the lacking formal 
consequence. It is rather to rephrase the propositions until they instance a valid form. 
But this requires a knowledge of material consequence that is independent of 
knowledge of syllogistic. 
The same knowledge is required where propositions can be construed in such a 
way as to instance a valid form while forming a materially invalid argument. The Port-
Royal Logic also contains an example of this sort: 
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We should believe Scripture; 
Tradition is not at all Scripture; 
 We should not believe tradition. 
The terms could be assigned as follows: S = “We should believe”; M = “Scripture”; P = 
“tradition”. The mood of the syllogism is then: SiM; MeP (by conversion)  SoP, which is 
Ferio – a valid mood. But we can see intuitively that the argument is invalid. The trick 
occurs at the final SoP-form proposition. A proposition in that form, with the terms as 
defined, makes at first the ungrammatical: “some we should believe is not tradition” – 
this is what Lewis Carroll calls the normal form of the proposition (Carroll 1986, 67). It 
is not immediately obvious how to turn this into something more grammatical. But “we 
should not believe tradition” does not seem a bad candidate. After all, the first 
proposition in the syllogism – “We should believe Scripture” – corresponds to the 
normal form: “Some we should believe is Scripture”. The concluding proposition is 
grammatically isomorphic, with the addition of a negation operator.25 What warns us 
against this rendering in this context, however, is the fact that the conclusion thus 
expressed plainly does not follow from the premises given. We can see intuitively that 
what does follow is, rather, “some of what we should believe is not tradition”. And so we 
know that this is how we should construe the final SoP proposition if the syllogism is to 
be valid. Again, we know this not by the syllogistic; rather, it is the knowledge we 
require to avoid drawing an incorrect result concerning validity from the syllogistic. 
For their part, the authors of the Port-Royal Logic suggest that we rewrite the 
whole argument as follows: 
Scripture should be believed; 
Tradition is not Scripture; 
 Tradition should not be believed. 
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Now the assignments of terms are: S = “Tradition”; M = “Scripture”; P = “should be 
believed”, and the mood is: MaP; SeM  SeP – a vicious mood. We can see that this is a 
superior formal analysis, since it brings out the intuitively apparent invalidity of the 
argument.  
In both this case and the previous one, the rules of syllogistic are no use to us 
unless we already know whether or not the conclusion follows from the premises. We 
know this, as Descartes proposes, because we know about the terms – the substance – of 
the syllogism. Just understanding the meanings of the propositions is enough for us to 
see whether or not the conclusions follow from the premises. 
Stephen Read, in discussing the difference between formal and material validity, 
points out that every argument is an instance of an invalid form; for instance, every 
two-premise argument is of the (invalid) form: P, Q ⊢ R (Read 1994, 248). Likewise 
pretty well any syllogism in natural language can be rendered an instance of an invalid 
form: reading “men” and “a man” as distinct terms we can make the syllogism “Socrates 
is a man; all men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal” an invalid four-term 
syllogism. The traditional syllogistic does not include rules for how to treat different 
words in natural language as forming one term, nor one word as distinct terms where 
the word is equivocal. Some help might be given by theories of supposition. Descartes, 
for his part, does not directly discuss supposition. But, again, it is prima facie plausible 
that no knowledge of such theories is necessary to see the appropriateness of rewriting 
certain arguments in natural language so that the syllogistic gives the correct ruling on 
validity. Quite the reverse, such knowledge is indispensable in working out a viable 
theory of supposition.  
As I read him, Descartes’s point is that we can always intuitively recognise the 
material validity or invalidity of an argument – the relation between the truth of its 
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premises and conclusion – and that it is this knowledge that inspires us to look for a 
way to show the same argument to be formally valid.26 Even if we cannot find such a 
way, we continue to know that the argument is valid. And contrariwise, even if our 
formal theory overgenerates, providing forms under which a materially invalid 
argument appears to be valid, we do not change our view of its material invalidity. 
Instead we are motivated to correct our formal analysis. Whether or not this is true of 
modern theories of formal logic, Descartes’s claim that it is true of the syllogistic is well-
supported by his examples and those of the Port-Royal Logic. 
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Notes 
1 Rule 10, AT 10.406 / CSM 1.36. 
2 Alan Nelson also calls the Port-Royal Logic “a virtual compendium of Cartesianism” (Nelson 2015, 252)  
3 Mill identifies the syllogistic as an instance of the more general “paradox of deduction”. On this paradox 
in relation to Descartes see Rogers and Nelson (2015). 
4 I do not mean to undertake a full analysis of the cogito argument, nor to address the contested questions 
of whether it is in fact an inference and, if so, what sort of inference. An unrepresentative sample of the 
literature on these and related questions: Hintikka (1962); Kenny (1968, ch.3); Williams (1990, ch.3); 
Wilson (1982, 45–62); Alanen (1981); Markie (1998). 
5 See also Frans Burman’s report of his conversation with Descartes on this point (AT 5.147 / CSM 3.333). 
6 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the salience of this example to me. 
7 See the passage quoted in note 5. 
8 AT 7.35 / CSM 7.24. 
9 Gaukroger points this out, linking to an article by Jonathan Barnes: Gaukroger (1989, 20); Barnes (1969) 
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10 See also AT 7.544 / CSM 2.371. It might be replied that Descartes could have changed his mind about 
syllogisms between writing the Rules and writing the Replies. But elsewhere in the Replies Descartes 
offers a warning about becoming too trapped in the method of “the Dialecticians”, which somewhat 
echoes the criticism in the Rules – AT 7.206 / CSM 2.271. 
11 We might need to add “certainly” to each instance of “known” here, if we follow Normore’s thesis that 
the validity of arguments, for Descartes, concerns the transmission of certainty (Normore 1993). 
12 Wittichius (1653, 1.2.3,8) See Douglas (2015, 98) 
13 See Charrak (2005) 
14 It is not my purpose here to specify what Descartes means in saying that one proposition follows from 
another. On this vexed question, see (Gaukroger 1989; Normore 1993; Rogers and Nelson 2015; Owen 
2002, 13–29; David B. Wong 1982) 
15 AT 10.369 / CSM 1.15. 
16 I do not mean to imply that “deduction is intuition plus memory” is all there is to be said about 
Descartes’s theory of deduction. For more discussion, see, in addition to the sources cited in note 14 
above, Clarke (1977); Recker (2008) 
17 Nelson refers to: Mancosu (1999) 
18 A detailed discussion of the nature of intuition, and the objects towards which it is directed, can be 
found in Nelson (2015) 
19 AT 10.431 / CSM 1.52. 
20 l is length of string, t is thickness, and w is tension weight. I substitute “half as thick” for Descartes’s 
vague “not as thick”. 
21 Rule 10: AT X.408 / CSM 1.37. 
22 See note 2 above. Note also that one of the main authors of the Port-Royal Logic, Antoine Arnauld, was a 
close friend and follower of Descartes and a loyal defender of his system against rivals. Among other 
relevant works, see: Ndiaye (1991); Kremer (1996); Nadler (1989); Schmaltz (2002); Moreau (1999). 
23 The clause “divine law commands” is excluded from the logical form as a mere “incidental proposition”, 
akin to “who was son of Philip” in the proposition “Alexander, who was son of Philip, defeated the 
Persians” (see Arnauld and Nicole 1992, 2.7, 117)). But we need not quibble about this; somebody who 
wanted to treat it as essential could simply replace “honoured” with “honoured according to divine law”, 
with the same result respecting the validity of the syllogism. 
24 “Consequences are divided thus: some are material, others are formal. A formal consequence is one 
which holds in all terms, given similar mutual arrangement (dispositio) and form of the terms. A material 
consequence is one which does not hold in all terms given similar mutual arrangement and form so that 
the only variation is in the terms themselves.” – Pseudo-Scotus, quoted in Bocheński (1961, § 30.12). 
25 An alternative would be to analyze the first proposition as being of the form SaP. But then by parity the 
final proposition, which is grammatically identical with the addition of a negation operator, should be of 
the form SeP. And then, again, we have a valid mood – Celarent – with the false conclusion. 
26 Modern philosophers of logic might be inclined to ask what it means to say that the conclusion follows 
from the premises in this case. It cannot mean that the conclusion can be formally inferred from the 
premises. Sources discussing this problem in relation to Descartes are given above, but some modern 
discussions are found in Kapitan (1982); Read (1994); Etchemendy (1999); Dutilh Novaes (2005b).  
For pre-Cartesian historical background, see Dutilh Novaes (2007, Part 2, 2005a); Klima (2016). 
